It seems that the Very Serious People are determined to make one of my predictions for 2020 come true before 2011 is out, and bring on a full-blown public panic a mature and reasoned discussion about the strategic implications of China’s military modernization. OK, that’s unfair. But there has been, quietly, a stream of articles and report from various strategic policy wonks about this topic.
Hugh White’s Quarterly Essay last year argued that China’s economic growth means that it will have the wirewithal, sooner or later, to contest American primacy in Asia. Now, we have Ross Babbage’s report (which I don’t have a copy of yet) which considers, more directly, the military implications.
I don’t have access to the report itself, but Graham Dobell’s post at the Lowy Interpreter indicates that Babbage has a whole shopping list of suggestions to deal with this:
Babbage was intimately involved in thinking through the 2009 Defence White Paper, yet he casts aside large elements of the document. He wants to refocus planning and development ‘for the next two decades on the direct defence of Australia to offset and deter the rapidly-expanding PLA in Australia’s approaches.’ The Babbage rethink would upend the Australian Army and completely remake the White Paper plans for the Navy. This approach would see Australia:
- Abandon the plan to build a dozen conventional submarines, instead buying 10 nuclear-powered attack submarines from the US.
- Build 20 stealthy arsenal ships capable of firing long-range missiles.
- Reconfigure the Army to perform long-range special force operations.
- Create an even deeper partnership with the US, with American forces based in Australia.
- Make large investments in advanced cyber and space warfare capabilities.
It’s worth noting here that Dobell (and presumably Babbage) are not arguing that war with China is in any way inevitable, or even likely; however, the existence of the capability, and the uncertainty surrounding the intentions of an authoritarian state, make sufficient deterrence prudent.
The technical questions on whether American-built nuclear-powered attack submarines, arsenal ships, stealth fighters, and Illudium Q-36 Explosive Space Modulators are the right way to “rip arms off” the future People’s Liberation Army Navy of a couple of decades’ time can keep the Biggles types amused for ages.
Whatever. While Babbage has thrown in a mention of ‘cyberwar’, it seems to me that like many defence thinkers he’s still still planning around some variation of the great navies meeting out on the high seas; almost, in effect, the modern version of the two medival armies meeting on the battlefield, to the sound of trumpets and clashing swords.
This hasn’t happened since WWII. Full-scale invasions have been exceptionally hard to pull off, and very few have even been tried. Not to put too fine a point on it, but relatively small countries have been able to deter much larger ones, including the United States.
If strategic studies types really want to debate deterring China, it might do them credit to be fully intellectually honest and spell out their reasoning as to why deterrence involves a vast, relatively conventional naval force, when, over the past 50 years, other small nations facing the possibility of threats from larger ones have taken several rather different approaches.